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Introduction 
 
One of the items that Congress added to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
President Obama’s stimulus package, was a first-time homebuyer tax credit. The tax credit gave 
people buying their first home, or who had not been homeowners for at least three years, a tax 
credit equal to 10 percent of the purchase price of the home, up to $8,000. The intention was to 
spur home buying and put an end to the plunge in home prices, which were dropping at an annual 
rate of close to 20 percent at the time. According to the Government Accountability Office, 2.3 
million people took advantage of the credit, at a cost to the government of $16.2 billion.1 
 
The impact of the tax credit is easy to see in the data. There was a sharp jump in existing home sales 
almost immediately after the credit was passed into law. It was also successful in ending the plunge 
in prices. Prices stabilized in the second quarter of 2009, just after the first-time credit went into 
effect. They actually rose somewhat in the second half of the year as homebuyers rushed to take 
advantage of the credit before it was initially scheduled to end in November. There was a second 
surge in buying, and a corresponding rise in prices, in the second quarter of 2010 as an extension of 
the credit ended.  
 
In this sense the credit had a substantial impact on the housing market, as was intended. However, if 
its proponents expected the credit to permanently sustain bubble-inflated home prices, they would 
have been badly disappointed. After the expiration of the extension of the credit in April of 2010, 
sales plunged and prices followed. The effect of the credit was primarily to pull purchases forward. 
There were not many people who would be motivated to buy a home who would not have 
otherwise, even with this relatively generous credit. Essentially, the credit persuaded many people 
who might have bought a home in the second half of 2010 or 2011 to buy their home in 2009 or the 
first half of 2010. 
 
This delayed the deflation of the bubble, but did not stop it. By the end of 2011, nationwide home 
prices had fallen by 8.4 percent since the credit-induced peak reached in the second quarter of 2010.2 
They are continuing to fall into 2012. The temporary boost to the market from the credit allowed 
many homeowners to sell their homes at prices that were still partially inflated by the bubble. This 
was good for these homeowners, as well as their creditors, who might have otherwise been forced to 
accept short sales. However, it was bad news for homebuyers who were persuaded to buy homes at 
prices that were often still above trend values.  
 
This paper briefly outlines the impact of the homebuyer credit. The first part produces a set of 
calculations of the amount of wealth transferred to sellers and creditors as a result of the credit. 
These calculations are intended to determine the additional amount that homebuyers paid for homes 
as a result of the credit, as opposed to a situation in which the housing market had been allowed to 
continue its decline unchecked. The second part of the paper focuses on some of the cities where 
the credit appears to have had the greatest impact. It looks at the extent to which buyers of less 
expensive homes – the segment of the market most influenced by the credit – experienced losses as 
a result of buying homes at bubble-inflated prices. 
                                                 
1 Government Accountability Office, 2010. “Usage and Selected Analyses of the First-Time Homebuyer Tax Credit,” 
GAO-10-1025R, available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1025R. 
2 This drop is based on data from the Case-Shiller nationwide home price index.  
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The Impact of the First-time Homebuyer Tax Credit on 
the National Housing Market 
 
There can be little doubt that the first-time homebuyer tax credit had a large impact on the country’s 
housing market. Sales took off almost immediately after the credit took effect. Sales had fallen below 
400,000 a month in January and February of 2009. In June, the first month when buyers could be 
motivated by the credit (existing home sales measure closings, which typically take two months from 
the signing of a contract and people usually look for a period of time before buying a home), sales 
jumped to 460,000 as shown in Figure 1. Sales continued to rise through the summer, peaking at 
600,000 in November, the month when the original credit was scheduled to expire. Sales remained 
high through the first half of 2010 as the credit was extended to apply to any home with a contract 
signed by April 30. Sales then fell to 380,000 in July of 2010 as the boost from the credit ended 
abruptly.  
 
FIGURE 1 
Existing Home Sales (seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: National Association of Realtors, Existing Home Sales 
 
The impact of the credit on prices is just as clear as can be seen in Figure 2. Nationwide, home 
prices had been falling at a rate of close to 2.0 percent a month through 2008 and into 2009. They 
stopped dropping almost immediately after the credit was passed, with prices in the second quarter 
of 2009 little changed from the first quarter. By the third quarter of the year, prices were rising as 
people rushed to take advantage of the credit before its original expiration date in November.3 The 
credit was subsequently extended to cover home sales that were contracted by the end of April of 
2010. This led to another spurt of buying and further increases in prices.  
 
                                                 
3 The original expiration date of November 30, 2009 was based on closing dates, which meant that a sale had to be 
contracted by the end of September to ensure enough time to close before the expiration date.   
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FIGURE 2 
Change in Home Prices, 1996-2011 
 
Source: National Association of Realtors, Existing Home Sales 
 
After the end of the extended credit, home prices began to resume their fall. By the end of 2011 they 
had fallen by 8.4 percent from the credit-induced peak. The credit gave people an incentive to buy 
sooner than would otherwise have been the case, pulling many purchases forward. That meant an 
increase in demand for the months when the credit was in effect, at the cost of lower demand in 
subsequent months. The result was that many people were persuaded to buy homes at bubble-
inflated prices who would have otherwise purchased them at prices that were more consistent with 
the longer-term trend in the housing market. This amounted to a substantial transfer of wealth from 
new homebuyers to home sellers. It also benefitted lenders, who in many cases may have been 
forced to accept a short sale with an underwater mortgage.  
 
Figure 3A shows the size of the transfer from new homebuyers to home sellers as a result of the 
purchases spurred by the credit. The ‘fast adjustment’ calculation assumes that home prices would 
have continued to fall at the same rate as they had fallen in the months preceding the introduction of 
the tax credit, until they reached the December 2011 level. It also assumes that home buying would 
have remained at the early 2009 pace (403,300 a month) until the end of the period in which the 
credit was in effect (June of 2010 for closings). The gap between the number actually sold over this 
period and the 403,300 is spread over the remaining 18 months between the end of June 2010 and 
December 2011. (See the Appendix for a fuller explanation.) 
 
In the ‘slow adjustment,’ it is assumed that the rate of price decline would have slowed even without 
the tax credit. In this scenario, prices decline at a steady rate from April of 2009 to December of 
2011 so that the price level at the end of 2011 is the actual price level. In this scenario, the gap 
between the number of homes actually sold in the months when the credit was in effect and the 
403,300 average for the first three months of 2009 is spread over the whole period from April of 
2009 and December of 2011. The middle scenario is simply an average of these two scenarios. 
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FIGURE 3A 
Homebuyer Tax Credit Induced Transfer 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, see Appendix. 
 
Figure 3a shows the amount of money transferred in each case. In the fast-adjustment scenario, the 
amount of money transferred from people who bought homes over this period to sellers would be 
$170.5 billion. In the slow scenario, it would be $84.9 billion. In the middle scenario, the amount of 
the transfer is $127.7 billion. The amount of the transfer in the fast-adjustment scenario comes to 
more than $10,600 for every homeowner who purchased a home over the 34 months since the 
passage of the first time buyers credit through the end of 2011. In the slow-adjustment scenario the 
transfer would come to $5,300 for every homeowner, with the transfer in the middle scenario equal 
to a bit less than $8,000 per home buyer.   
 
In real terms, the transfers were even larger, since cumulative inflation over this period was just 
under 6.9 percent using the consumer price index. This means that in real terms, by the end of 2011 
prices had fallen by 11.6 percent from their credit-induced peak in the spring of 2010. The implied 
transfers as a result of the tax credit are correspondingly larger after adjusting for inflation. Figure 
3B shows the transfers from homebuyers as a result of the tax credit in the same three scenarios 
described above, measured in 2009 dollars.  
 
FIGURE 3B 
Homebuyer Tax Credit Inflation-Adjusted Induced Transfer 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, see Appendix. 
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Measured in 2009 dollars, the transfer in the fast price-adjustment scenario would have been $353.2 
billion. In the slow-adjustment scenario it would have been $193.6 billion. In the middle scenario it 
would have been $273.4 billion. 
 
There is one other scenario worth considering. Prices were still falling at the end of 2011. Given the 
continued oversupply of housing by many measures (vacancy rates remain near record highs), it is 
likely that home prices will continue to fall through 2012. Suppose that prices fall another 5 percent 
in real terms over the course of 2012, a negative but hardly impossible scenario. This would imply 
that the tax credit was even more successful in delaying the collapse of the bubble and led to larger 
transfers from the people who bought homes during this period.  
 
Figure 3C shows the size of the implied transfers from new homebuyers in this scenario. In the 
fast-adjustment scenario, where home prices continued to fall rapidly until hitting a level that is 5 
percent lower in real terms than the December 2011 level, the amount of the transfer from new 
homebuyers as a result of the credit would be $581.7 billion. In the slow-adjustment scenario, where 
home prices gradually fall to this level over the period from April of 2009 to December of 2012, the 
transfer would be $287.0 billion, while in the middle scenario it would be $434.3 billion (all in 2009 
dollars).  
 
FIGURE 3C 
Homebuyer Tax Credit Inflation-Adjusted Induced Transfer, with Further Price Declines in 2012   
 
Source: Author’s calculations, see Appendix. 
 
These are clearly substantial sums that new homebuyers ended up paying in the form of higher 
home prices as a result of the effect of the tax credit on the housing market. It is important to note 
that most of this money did not come from recipients of the credit. Most of this money came from 
people who bought homes but did not qualify for the credit. Of course people who did not qualify 
for the first-time homebuyer credit likely were able to sell their former homes at higher prices as a 
result of the credit. In this sense, the credit was essentially a wash for them. They paid more than 
would have otherwise been the case for their new home, but they were able to sell their old home 
for a higher price as a result of the credit.  
 
The lenders were clear gainers in this story. If prices had fallen more quickly to the level reached in 
December, 2011 then many more homeowners would not have been able to pay off their mortgages. 
Many of these sales would have required lenders to write down a portion of the mortgages in short 
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sales or, alternatively, they may not have allowed the sales to go through at all. There is no symmetry 
from the lenders side, since the overwhelming majority of new mortgages issued in this period were 
guaranteed in some way by the government, either through mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac or guarantees from the Federal Housing Authority or Veterans Administration. 
Holders of mortgages and mortgage-backed securities at the time the credit was put in place were 
unambiguous winners from the first-time homebuyer tax credit. 
 
The tax credit also provided a benefit to builders who were better able to dispose of their 
inventories of unsold homes, which were reaching record levels during this period. The number of 
new homes being sold fell by more than two-thirds from the peaks of the bubble to the lows 
reached in 2009 and 2010. The sales price data do not control for quality, so there is no easy way to 
separate price declines that may be attributable to a change in the mix of homes being sold from 
price decline that reflects an actual drop in home prices. However, as a first approximation it is 
probably reasonable to assume that the gains to homebuilders in the form of higher prices and 
increased volume were proportional to their share of the market.   
 
Using this assumption, in the fast-adjustment scenario the gains to homebuilders would have been 
$12.9 billion. In the slow-adjustment scenario the gains would have been $6.4 billion, and the middle 
scenario $9.7 billion, as shown in Figure 4A. Figure 4B shows the same calculations, adjusted for 
inflation and measured in 2009 dollars. In this case, the transfer in the fast-adjustment scenario 
would be $26.6 billion and $14.6 billion in the slow-adjustment scenario. Figure 4C shows the size 
of the transfers to homebuilders, assuming a further real price decline of 5 percent in 2012. In this 
case, the transfer in the fast-adjustment scenario would be $43.8 billion. In the slow adjustment 
scenario it would be $21.6 billion. 
 
FIGURE 4A 
Homebuyer Tax Credit Induced Transfer to Builders 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, see Appendix. 
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FIGURE 4B 
Homebuyer Tax Credit Induced Transfer to Builders (Inflation Adjusted) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, see Appendix. 
 
FIGURE 4C 
Homebuyer Tax Credit Induced Transfer to Builders (assuming 2012 price decline) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, see Appendix. 
 
In short, the first-time homebuyer credit slowed the process of deflating the bubble. This meant that 
many homes were sold at higher prices than would otherwise have been the case. This 
unambiguously benefitted lenders, who were able to collect a higher percentage of outstanding 
mortgage debt as a result of the delay in the bubble’s deflation, and also homebuilders who were 
able to sell newly-built homes at higher prices than they could have otherwise. Homeowners who 
sold in this period would have benefited if they moved into a rental unit; if they bought another 
home, the gain from the higher sale price would be largely offset by a higher purchase price.4 
 
On the buying side, most of the cost of higher home prices was borne by people who did not 
benefit from the credit, although if they had another home to sell, the higher buying price is largely 
offset by the higher selling price. First-time homebuyers would have paid more for homes than they 
would have in the absence of the credit. While the credit in many cases would have offset some or 
                                                 
4 The extended credit also included a $6,500 credit for people moving up to a more expensive home.  
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all of the subsequent decline in prices, in many markets this would almost certainly not be true. This 
issue is discussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
 
Regional Differences in the Impact of the First-time 
Homebuyer Credit 
 
While the impact of the first-time homebuyer credit can be seen clearly in the national data, its 
impact differed substantially across regions and by home type within a region. The structure of the 
credit as a first-time homebuyer credit that was capped at $8,000 meant that it would have the largest 
impact on the lower portion of the market in less expensive cities. This is true both because first-
time buyers are most likely going to be buying lower-cost homes and also because $8,000 will have 
more impact in cities like Atlanta and Minneapolis, with relatively inexpensive housing markets, than 
cities like New York and Boston, with considerably more expensive housing.  
 
These differences show up clearly in the data. Figure 5A through 5P show the path of home prices 
since January of 2006 in 16 of the 20 cities in the Case-Shiller index for which tiered data is available. 
While prices have declined everywhere since the end of the first-time homebuyer tax credit, in 13 of 
these 16 cities, the sharpest declines have been in the bottom tier of the market. (The three 
exceptions are the California cities in the index: Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco.)  
  
 
FIGURE 5A 
Atlanta Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
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FIGURE 5B 
Boston Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
 
FIGURE 5C 
Chicago Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
 
FIGURE 5D 
Denver Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
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FIGURE 5E 
Las Vegas Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
 
FIGURE 5F 
Los Angeles Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
 
FIGURE 5G 
Miami Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
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FIGURE 5H 
Minneapolis Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
 
FIGURE 5I 
New York City Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
 
FIGURE 5J 
Phoenix Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
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FIGURE 5K 
Portland Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
 
FIGURE 5L 
San Diego Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
 
FIGURE 5M 
San Francisco Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
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FIGURE 5N 
Seattle Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
 
FIGURE 5O 
Tampa Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
 
FIGURE 5P 
Washington, D.C. Metro Area Home Prices, 2006-2011 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
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In several of the cities the decline in the bottom tier has been quite dramatic. For example, in Seattle, 
prices for homes in the bottom tier fell by 19.6 percent from June of 2010 to December of 2011.  In 
Chicago, the decline was 31.4 percent. And in Atlanta, the drop was an incredible 49.1 percent. 
Figure 6 shows the cutoff price for the bottom tier of the housing market as of June 2010 in each 
of the 10 cities with the largest price declines. It shows the implied price for these homes today, 
based on the movement in the Case-Shiller index and the implied loss.  
 
In all 10 of these cities the price of homes in the bottom tier of the Case-Shiller index dropped at 
least 10 percent between the credit-induced peak in 2010 and December of 2011. In each case, the 
implied loss would vastly exceed the size of the credit, if the homebuyer was able to get it. 
Undoubtedly, many of the people who bought into these markets during the run-up caused by the 
tax credit are now underwater in their homes. This would almost certainly be the case for many 
people who got loans through the Federal Housing Authority, which allowed them to put just 3.0 
percent down. At least for these homebuyers, it is difficult to view the tax credit as very wise policy.  
 
 
FIGURE 6 
Impact of First-time Homebuyer Credit in 10 Cities 
 
Source: Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices and author's calculations. 
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Conclusion 
 
The fact that the first-time homebuyer credit would have the effect of luring millions of homebuyers 
into paying too much for a home should not have been a surprise. At the time the credit was put 
into effect, the housing bubble had not fully deflated, in the sense that home prices were still above 
their long-term trend. In this context, there was little reason to believe that a temporary tax credit 
could stabilize prices. The basic problem remained that home prices were above a level where supply 
and demand could be brought into balance. By pulling purchases forward the credit could only 
temporarily delay this adjustment process. The tax credit could redistribute the losses on housing, 
from the homeowners at the time the credit was passed and the holders of their mortgages to new 
homeowners and the holders of new mortgages, which was primarily the government. The size of 
this redistribution was in the hundreds of billions of dollars.   
  
It was remarkable that the Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury Department, the Council of 
Economic Advisers and other top economic officials managed to overlook the largest asset bubble 
in the history of the world as it was growing. It was even more remarkable that they continued to 
overlook it even as its collapse wrecked the economy and gave us the worst economic downturn 
since the Great Depression. If these officials had been paying attention, there would presumably 
have been more opposition to the first-time homebuyer tax credit. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 3A – To construct the counterfactual set of prices and sales in order to calculate the amount 
of money transferred from sellers to buyers, the fast-adjustment assumed that home prices 
continued to fall at the same real rate they had been falling in the year prior to the passage of the 
first-time homebuyer tax credit (5.0 percent a quarter), until they reached the real level of December 
2011. (The rate of price decline is taken from the Case-Shiller national index.) It assumed that the 
sales rate for all of 2009 would have remained at its level for the first four months of the year 
(403,300) in the absence of the credit until the end of the credit’s impact in June of 2010. The 
additional sales over this period (1,537,000 houmes) are then spread evenly over the subsequent 18 
months from July 2010 until December of 2011. The revenue transferred is then the difference 
between revenue calculated using actual sales prices and quantities and these assumed 
counterfactuals summed over the period from June 2009 to June 2010. 
 
In the slow-adjustment scenario, it is assumed that prices would have adjusted at an even pace to 
their December 2011 level, falling at a real rate of 0.35 percent per month. This calculation assumes 
that in the absence of the credit the additional 1,537,000 in home sales calculated above would have 
been distributed evenly over the months from June of 2009 through December of 2011, with this 
number (49,600) being added to actual sales for the months after the end of the credit’s impact in 
2010. In the months for which the credit was having an effect, this number was added to 403,300 
baseline assumed in the fast decline scenario described above. The size of the revenue transfer was 
calculated in the same way described above. 
 
The middle scenario is a simple average of these two calculations. 
 
Figure 3B – The calculation in Figure 3B uses the consumer price index to express the totals in 
Figure 3A in 2009 dollars. 
 
Figure 3C – The fast-adjustment scenario assumes a counterfactual with the same rate of price 
decline as in Figure 1, except this rate of price decline continues until real prices hit a level that is 5 
percent below their December 2011 level. The slow adjustment scenario assumes an even rate of 
price decline so that prices in December 2012 hit a real level that is 5.0 percent below the December 
2011 level. The rate of home sales assumed in these counterfactuals is the same as described for 
Figure 1 above. The middle scenario is also calculated in the same way. 
 
Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c  – These were constructed in the same way as Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c, with the 
only difference that data on new homes sales and prices were used.  
 
 
 
    
